Managing in-country transportation risks in humanitarian supply chains by logistics service providers: Insights from the 2015 Nepal earthquake by Baharmand, Hossein et al.
Author’s Accepted Manuscript
Managing in-country transportation risks in
humanitarian supply chains by logistics service
providers: Insights from the 2015 Nepal earthquake
Hossein Baharmand, Tina Comes, Matthieu Lauras
PII: S2212-4209(17)30217-0
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.07.007
Reference: IJDRR611
To appear in: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
Received date: 15 March 2017
Revised date: 22 July 2017
Accepted date: 23 July 2017
Cite this article as: Hossein Baharmand, Tina Comes and Matthieu Lauras,
Managing in-country transportation risks in humanitarian supply chains by
logistics service providers: Insights from the 2015 Nepal earthquake,
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.07.007
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for
publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of
the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and
review of the resulting galley proof before it is published in its final citable form.
Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which
could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdr
1 
 
Managing in-country transportation risks in 
humanitarian supply chains by logistics service 
providers: insights from the 2015 Nepal earthquake 
Hossein Baharmanda*, Tina Comes
b
, Matthieu Lauras
c
 
a
Department of ICT, University of Agder, 4879 Grimstad, Norway 
b
Department of ICT, University of Agder, 4879 Grimstad, Norway 
c
Mines d`Albi, University of Toulouse, 81000 Albi, France 
hossein.baharmand@uia.no 
tina.comes@uia.no 
matthieu.lauras@mines-albi.fr 
*Corresponding author: +47 37233431. 
Abstract 
Humanitarian supply chains (HSCs) play a central role in effective and efficient disaster relief 
operations. Transportation has a critical share in HSCs and managing its risks helps to avoid 
further disruptions in relief operations. However, there is no common approach to or culture 
of risk management that its applicability has been studied through recent cases. This paper 
incorporates an empirical research design and makes a threefold contribution: first it 
identifies in-country transportation risks during Nepal response. Second, we evaluate afore 
identified risks through an expert driven risk assessment grid. Third, we use our field data to 
study how some humanitarian organizations in Nepal response used logistics service 
providers for managing those moderate- and high-level risks. 
In this paper, we use both qualitative and quantitative methods. Our qualitative analysis 
reveals that some of the most important in-country transportation risks were delivery 
delays; market fluctuations; insufficient capacity; loss of cargo; cargo decay; unreliable 
information; and ethical concerns. Our quantitative work shows that while participants 
categorized the first three risks as high-level risks, the rest were ranked as moderate-level. 
More investigation in our field data indicates that using logistics service providers (LSPs) 
helped humanitarians significantly to manage afore in-country transportation risks during 
Nepal response. It also improved overall HSC performance with respect to flexibility, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and responsiveness. While this finding empirically confirms the 
“tools” role of LSPs for managing in-country transportation risks in response, it implies 
another role for LSPs; “contributors” to performance improvements. 
Keywords 
Humanitarian supply chain, Transportation risks, Logistics service providers, Field research, 
2015 Nepal earthquake 
1. Introduction 
Supply chain risks are, fundamentally, the outcome of uncertain events that prevent the 
supply chain from achieving its performance aims [1]. In the context of disaster response, 
these risks emerge due to wrong assessments and misjudgments based on uncertainties 
(supply, demand, fleets, locations, etc.), complex operating conditions in the field, the effect 
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of the disaster on local labor and infrastructure, and structural differences between 
responders, especially humanitarian organizations (HOs) [2]. While there is a growing 
awareness among HOs about the nature of risks in response contexts, current approaches to 
risk management in such contexts are often ad hoc, inconsistent and fragmented [3]: there is 
no common approach to or culture of risk management among HOs. Differences are 
particularly stark between HOs, including in relation to which risks they prioritize, how they 
balance them, and how they link them with disaster relief objectives [4].  
Disaster relief operations crucially rely on the functionality of humanitarian supply chains 
(HSCs) where transportation is a key operational element [5]. Specifically, in-country 
transportation, that covers means for shipping relief items and aid to beneficiaries, moving 
personnel and/or affected people, and conducting needs assessments, plays a significant 
role in disaster response.  There is, however, a lack of research about how and to what 
extent managing in-country transportation risks within the HSC fosters effectiveness, 
efficiency, and responsiveness and in turn, better response performance. Especially the need 
for corresponding empirical work has been pointed out [6, 7].  
Our empirical work is based on a field research after the 2015 Nepal earthquake, including 
systematic observations and interviews. Our field study objectives include identifying relief 
distribution bottlenecks in Nepal response along with investigating those approaches that 
helped HOs to deal with logistics challenges (e.g., capacity). We use findings of our 
qualitative field study to develop a survey regarding the impacts of in-country transportation 
risks on HSC performance. Given the impacts and risk analysis results, we study the impact of 
risk management techniques that we observed in our field research.  
Our multi-method approach in this study is therefore aimed at (a) identifying particular in-
country transportation risks that threatened relief operations in Nepal; (b) assess identified 
risks by the help of practitioners; and (c) analyze a common approach that studied HOs used 
for managing some moderate and high transportation risks, i.e. employing logistics service 
providers (LSPs). 
Related literature regarding the role of LSPs in disaster relief is described in Section 2. The 
research design is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, outcomes of data analysis are 
explained with respect to our research aims. Then, we discuss our research findings and 
implications for theory and practice in Section 5. We conclude with opportunities for future 
research in Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
In this section, we present the theoretical framework of our research. First, we compare risk 
management strategies in commercial and humanitarian contexts and narrow the scope of 
our research. Then, we review the role of LSPs in disaster relief operations and position our 
contribution in the literature. 
2.1. Risk management and humanitarian contexts 
Supply chain risks are classified differently in the literature; internal and external [8]; 
operational and disruption [9]; and micro and macro [10]. Despite different titles, afore 
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taxonomies often cover risks with similar characteristics. While external, macro, or 
disruption risks are driven by the event of a natural or man-made disaster, risks in internal, 
micro, or operational category originate from internal activities of organizations, HOs in our 
study, and their relationship with partners [8-10]. Our study focuses on the latter category, 
micro risks, which include demand, supply, manufacturing, and infrastructure risks [11]. 
According to Pontré, Welter, Malta, Faria and Chernyshova [4], researchers have paid 
considerable attention to the risks of demand, supply, and manufacturing. However, 
infrastructure risks - the risks that are related to information technology, transportation, and 
financial systems - are rarely addressed [2, 12] although their disruption can lead to serious 
problems in HSC [13]. 
Due to the critical role of transportation in HSCs, managing its risks is of great importance. 
Supply chain risk management literature suggests four techniques and strategies for 
managing risks, i.e. control & accept, become flexible & reduce the probability, cooperate & 
transfer, and mitigate & avoid [14]. However, not all of afore strategies are applicable in 
humanitarian response contexts due to: the urgent nature of interventions, the short time-
frame for achieving ‘success’, the tangible objectives set for disaster relief, and the 
comparative simplicity of partnerships in commercial SCs [3].  
Accept and avoid strategies are not easily applicable humanitarian response. In general, 
accept strategy is used when the risk cannot be further reduced, transferred or avoided [11]. 
Accepting risks in the chaotic response implies further disruptions and can result in more 
social and financial loss, in comparison to other contexts. Also, avoiding strategy yields 
trade-offs between weights of the risk and the humanitarian imperative – the urgency and 
scale of the need for life-saving assistance [3]. Due to the higher weight of humanitarian 
imperative in majority of cases [3], this strategy is seldom taken into account in 
humanitarian response, in comparison to commercial contexts. In the latter, a risk may 
simply become unacceptable based on a profitability cost-benefit analysis which may lead to 
a decision to end the activity or quit the operation [11].  
Reducing risk probability through enhancing flexibility [15] is an effective strategy for 
humanitarian contexts but may not be always efficient. In this regard, Hajdarovic and Jensen 
[16] provide supporting evidence about the positive influence of some commercial practices 
toward improving flexibility on the responsiveness of HSCs [16]. However, the cost-
effectiveness of such practices has not been yet studied in humanitarian contexts. 
Accordingly, a recent study shows that more than 90% of HOs could not provide a medium 
level of flexibility in their SCs during Nepal response [17]. Implementation of some 
approaches for enhancing flexibility requires comparable access to monetary and non-
monetary resources which demands careful consideration and planning [17]. 
The remaining strategy, transfer, means “allocating risks to the parties best able to manage 
them” [5]. In this regard, Tang and Musa [11] contend that LSPs, i.e. logistics service 
providers, can improve the management of underlying risks in SCs. The term LSP refers to a 
company provides logistics services for other companies [18]. Skjoett-Larsen, Halldorsson, 
Andersson, Dreyer, Virum and Ojala [19] define three LSP categories with respect to the 
services they provide: physical logistics activities, organization and responsibility for 
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implementation, and third-party logistics providers (3PLs). Recently, the category of fourth-
party logistics providers (4PLs) has emerged which refers to 3PLs with broader involvement 
in management and decision-making [20, 21].  
Some HOs (e.g. Canadian Red Cross) benefit from transferring strategy for dealing with 
transportation risks: they delegate some (or all) logistics services, e.g. transportation, to LSPs 
[22], or other HOs, as humanitarian LSPs [5]. Some other HOs (e.g. IFRC) invest on reducing 
strategy through improving flexibility in their SCs [23]. In this paper, we focus on reducing 
and transferring strategies for managing in-country transportation risks. We limit our study 
scope to the first two categories of LSPs due to their common usage in recent humanitarian 
response operations [24]. 
2.2. Logistics service providers and their roles in disaster relief 
In HSC literature, although very few studies can be found, LSPs has been studied within three 
roles in relief operations: as “members”, “actors”, or “tools” [24]. As “members”, LSPs share 
their resources with HOs, transfer their knowledge, and expand their partners` network. 
Heaslip [7] acknowledges that business can extend much needed technical expertise to the 
assisted HO and `fill gaps in humanitarian action.' In return, as Binder and Witte [25] note, 
LSPs achieve positive branding, improved staff motivation, access to business intelligence, 
and a desire to ‘do good.’  
As “actors”, LSPs support HOs through partnerships and coordination. The former refers to 
offering all kinds of logistics activities [24]. Samii [26] indicates that cooperation between 
HOs and LSPs can result in cost efficiency, timeliness, accuracy, and flexibility. Furthermore, 
Abidi, de Leeuw and Klumpp [27] present the positive influence of LSPs on relief operations 
in complex disasters environments and provide key drivers for increasing and simplifying 
collaboration between them and other HSC actors. In the scope of coordination, LSPs are 
referred to as enablers of supply chain integration [28], vertical coordination [29], and 
horizontal coordination [30, 31].  
As “tools” LSPs provide professional logistics services to HOs [24]. Bealt, Fernández Barrera 
and Mansouri [32] study the use of LSPs among some HOs and find that practitioners prefer 
to use LSPs in preparedness (44%) more than immediate response (41%), mitigation (6%), 
and recovery (9%). However, Binder and Witte [25] contend that whether in preparedness or 
response LSPs can bring several advantages in mobilization, transport and distribution of 
relief items. In other studies, the use of LSPs has also shown improvements in effectiveness 
[33] and responsiveness [34] of relief operations. 
Some studies contend that the role of LSPs, regardless of type, in humanitarian operations is 
still marginal [25, 35] and very few LSPs have been involved in recent disaster relief 
operations [24, 30, 36]. Three directions can be observed. First, there is some concern about 
incorporating LSPs in the humanitarian context with respect to their impacts on the 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence [24]. Second, 
humanitarian contexts entail continuity issue which relates to HO’s short-term service and 
high staff turnover [30, 32]. Third, the cost of LSP services is not still justified among HOs. In 
5 
 
their research, [25] refer to the lack of understanding about what LSPs can bring into the 
humanitarian domain, as another barrier that demands further study [28]. 
Recent surveys call for further empirical research to shed lights on currently identified and 
other roles that LSPs can play in HSC and their consequences [7, 24, 37]. To the best of our 
knowledge, very few paper study LSPs in humanitarian contexts empirically [31, 32, 38]. 
Among them, Bealt, Fernández Barrera and Mansouri [32], [38] conduct interviews with 
humanitarians to find some solutions for barriers that hinder LSPs involvement in HSC as 
actors. In the most relevant study to our research, Cozzolino, Rossi and Conforti [31] 
investigate the impact of using LSPs on agility and leanness of relief operations within a real 
case; UNWFP response to Sudan crisis. Through their exploratory research, Cozzolino, Rossi 
and Conforti [31]  briefly explain that using LSPs supports addressing disruptions to 
traditional supply chain flows and other forces that disrupt logistics, production, and 
information handling. However, further analysis of how and to what extent this support 
affect HSC performance has been left for future research. 
2.3. Research contribution 
Our literature review revealed a few gaps in the literature. First, to facilitate collaboration 
between LSPs and HOs, empirical research is still required to understand the elements that 
drive, facilitate, constraint, and affect the relationship between them. Second, the impact of 
using LSPs on HSC within different roles demands empirical verification, as a solution that 
justifies their costs and fosters their involvement in future relief operations. 
Our work is based on a field study after the 2015 Nepal earthquake. It empirically studies the 
impact of using LSPs in managing transportation risks after a sudden onset natural disaster. 
Beyond less exposure to disruptions in HSC due to transferred risks, as we will show, using 
LSPs also entails improving HSC flexibility because it reduces the risk probability significantly.   
3. Research design 
In this paper, we follow the well-known risk management cycle: identify, assess, plan, 
implement, and review [11]. However, since we intend to investigate the impact of LSPs on 
managing HSC risks, planning and implementing steps are not in the scope of our paper. In 
other words, our research design is composed of three main steps. First, we identify in-
country transportation risks empirically. Risk identification helps in recognizing the potential 
hazards and is the first step toward managing risks effectively [10]. Also, identifying risks 
empirically brings insights on this topic from a practitioner`s point of view for further 
effective risk analysis [39]. Second, we develop a practitioner`s oriented measurement scale 
and investigate transportation risks` impacts. Based on risks impacts, we categorize them. 
Categorization helps to prioritize risk management techniques and/or action plans [11]. 
Eventually, we review risk management strategies that HOs used to manage identified and 
categorized transportation risks. Our focus is on those strategies that included LSPs.  
We use both qualitative and quantitative methods in our research design. For the 
identification step, our research follows the empirical case-study research design for theory 
testing [17]. Given the aim of our study, we collect empirical evidence regarding the role of 
LSPs in Nepal response, where our methods are inspired by similar field studies in disaster 
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settings. In the second step, evaluation, and prioritization of risks, we use a questionnaire in 
combination with an expert risk assessment grid. Finally, we analyze our field data to find 
out how HOs managed identified transportation risks during Nepal response. In this step, we 
specifically focus on the role that LSPs played.  
3.1. Field research design 
Our field research aimed to identify logistics challenge and study underlying problems from 
the ground and in close collaboration with practitioners. To ensure considering details and 
sensitivities between several variables in the field, we incorporated a research design which 
is illustrated in Figure 1. The workflow of research design is composed of four main steps 
and they are designed to effectively capture complexities in the field. Our field research 
design starts with preparation step by gathering results of literature review and other 
relevant sources to define research questions and to develop research protocols. On-site 
and remote data collection, the second step, follow the prepared protocols in step 1 toward 
the combination, or “triangulation” [40], of quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview, 
observation, document review) methods for collecting as much data as possible regarding 
the targeted objectives. Hence, the weaknesses of one method would be compensated by 
the counterbalancing strengths of another method in order to capture a more complete, i.e. 
holistic and contextual portrayal of study objectives [40]. The third step includes combining 
data from all sources (field, literature, best practices), categorizing them with their relevance 
to our predefined themes, and including them in data analysis. In the final step, fourth, 
results of the analysis are categorized into theory testing outcomes. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of our field research design 
3.1.1. Nepal field research and its preparations 
Our Nepal field research was carried out approximately six weeks after the second major 
earthquake during June 21-29, 2015. The focus of our field research was on the bottleneck 
and challenges of HSCs' downstream networks as well as problems in coordination, and 
information management.  
The preparations step started in early days of May 2015, after the first earthquake, and was 
composed of: 
 preparing a timeline of concurring events after the earthquake; 
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 collecting and archiving relevant documents from online sources: Humanitarian Data 
Exchange1, ReliefWeb2, MapAction3, and Logistics Cluster4; 
 preparing interview and observation protocols based on field research objectives; 
 and preparing the first list of interviewees through our pre-existing contacts at HOs 
along with those that we could confirm their participation by using online community 
platforms, especially, ReliefWeb, Humanitarian Data Exchange, and LinkedIn after 
searching for potential interviewees. These interviewees were selected based on 
their expertise (logistics), experience (having participated in more than four response 
operations), and availability (presence in Nepal during our field research). 
3.1.2. On-site and remote data collection 
Our methods for on-site data collection were inspired by similarly conducted field research 
in disaster settings [41-43]: semi-structured interviews, observations, and document review. 
We conducted 16 in-depth interviews with representatives from 10 HOs active in relief 
operations. Our interview protocol is presented in Appendix. Most of our interviews were 
carried out in Kathmandu. Once we had commenced field work in Kathmandu, we used 
snowballing technique [44] to identify new research participants. To avoid the limitations 
inherent in relying on information that interviewees provided only from one perspective, we 
used cross-validation during interviews to validate the findings whenever possible.  
During our field research, we interviewed logisticians from a range of different official 
organizations that were involved in the Nepal response, international HOs, international 
non-governmental organizations (iNGOs), and UN agencies. They were Canadian Red Cross, 
UN OCHA, UN WFP; Oxfam; Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), World Vision International 
(WVI), Cordaid, United Mission to Nepal (UMN), Humedica, and Handicap International. All 
of our interviews lasted less than one and a half hour and they were all recorded with the 
consent of interviewees. 
In addition to interviews, we spent four days observing interactions between humanitarians 
and local communities in Rasuwa and Nuwakot. These trips were arranged through our 
contacts at Kathmandu-based INGOs. On each location, we accompanied iNGO field workers 
and other humanitarian actors for two days in order to observe how they worked in the 
community, with community leaders, and with local partner NGOs. During our field research, 
we also focused on information sharing platforms and collected relevant documents for 
further analysis. These documents include maps, photos, newspaper articles, meeting 
minutes (logistics cluster and shelter cluster), data sheets, request forms, and white papers.  
Our remote data collection consisted of follow up emails and Skype interviews. These 
conversations included follow up questions from interviewees for filling the gaps in our on-
site collected data or for validating our analysis findings. 
                                                     
1
 https://data.humdata.org 
2
 http://reliefweb.int 
3
 http://mapaction.org 
4
 http://logcluster.org 
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3.1.3. Qualitative data analysis 
We used content analysis [45] for analyzing the collected data. First, in order to prepare all 
collected data for further indexation of keywords, we converted interviews to transcripts. 
Also, we added observation notes and other relevant data that was gathered before and 
during the field study. Then, we ordered all collected data by data source: interview 
transcripts, literature reviews, meeting minutes, field notes, white papers, newspaper 
articles, published initial reports, maps, and photos. Eventually, we categorized the data 
based on their relevance to logistics, coordination, and information management (initial 
themes of our field research). These groups of data shaped the basis for keyword indexation 
and further analysis. 
Keywords for indexation were extracted from our research questions and results of a 
thorough review of the literature regarding risks in humanitarian contexts, i.e. our 
constructs. To extract data regarding in-country transportation risks in HSC downstream 
network, we focused on these keywords: distribution risks, delivery risks, last mile, network 
risks, transportation risks, shipping, truck, driver, pilot, human resource, outsource, logistics 
service provider, third party, partnership, access, road blockage, landslides, accidents, 
vehicles, fleet, delegate, navigation, map, loading, unloading, and labor.  
We combined the open codes into themes distinguished by the most repetitive keywords.  
Relevant perspectives of the interviewees regarding the themes were extracted from 
transcripts, combined with other references and summarized to form a coherent narrative 
for each theme. By using frequency analysis [45], we were able to map out our collected 
data and to compare our data sources. Accordingly, we could check the consensus between 
them (literature and practitioners). Indeed, we decided regarding whether to include or 
exclude findings in our research based on the availability of sufficient field data for 
verification. Eventually, key findings regarding how LSPs helped HOs to handle their 
challenges were categorized according to each category of identified transportation risks.  
3.1.4. Validity and reliability 
To check the creditability of our qualitative data, we basically followed Guba and Lincoln 
[46]`s approach and only checked for validity: “since there can be no validity without 
reliability, a demonstration of the former [validity] is sufficient to check validity and 
reliability.” In this regard, as Figure 2 shows, two researchers looked for the convergence 
between our combined data in each theme. For solving conflicts, we checked data sources 
again: we reached the relevant interviewee(s) and/or we checked our data through online 
sources. Eventually, no conflict remained unsolved. 
9 
 
 
Figure 2. Validity check of our qualitative data 
3.2. Risk grid and online questionnaire 
We used the structure of the well-known five-scale risk evaluation grid [10], as shown in 
Figure 3, to assess risks with respect to impact and probability. We derived our probability 
evaluation grid from similar studies in the literature [47]. However, we developed impact 
measurement grid in close collaboration with humanitarian logistics experts. Two rounds of 
group discussion were organized (through Skype) with 4 experienced logisticians from 
different HOs (UNWFP, Medair, IFRC, CARE) to distinguish thresholds for impact levels 
(insignificant, minor, moderate, major, catastrophic). In this regard, three criteria were 
considered:  
 
Figure 3. Risk assessment matrix 
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 responsiveness, as measured by response time: the time with which necessary relief 
goods or services (including medical services) are delivered to the beneficiaries; 
 efficiency, as measured by cost: the financial expenditure of delivery operations; 
 and effectiveness, as measured by coverage: the percentage to which necessary 
relief goods or services (including medical services) are delivered to the beneficiaries. 
Eventually, the impact evaluation grid was defined as presented in Table 1. For the risks that 
may get two different scores for impact (based on their impact on different criteria), 
practitioners recommended using the higher impact score. 
Table 1. Risk impact scales, their definitions, and thresholds 
Impact scale Threshold 
Not significant: minor problem 
easily handled by normal day-
to-day processes; 
no considerable impact on responsiveness, efficiency, or 
effectiveness 
Minor: some disruptions 
possible; 
responsiveness: time impact less than one day; 
or efficiency: financial impact up to US$100K;  
or effectiveness: coverage impact less than 10%  
Moderate: significant time 
and/or resources are required; 
responsiveness: time impact between one and two days; 
or efficiency: financial impact up to US$500K 
or effectiveness: coverage impact between 10% and 40% 
Major: relief operations 
severely disrupted; 
responsiveness: time impact between two and five days; 
or efficiency: financial impact up to US$1m 
or effectiveness: coverage impact between 40% and 70% 
Catastrophic: continuation of 
relief operations is at risk; 
responsiveness: time impact more than five days; 
or efficiency: financial impact more than US$1m 
or effectiveness: coverage impact more than 70% 
 
Using the risk grids and equivalent values, the overall risk score is calculated by multiplying 
risk impact and probability. In order to get values for risk impact and probability, we 
prepared an online questionnaire and sent it to eight humanitarian logisticians with 
experience in four or more response operations to fill in our questionnaire. At the time of 
this research, they were working at WFP, Oxfam, IRW, WVI, Cordaid, UMN, Humedica, and 
Handicap International. The response rate was 100%. The questionnaire consisted of an 
explanation of the assessment process, definitions of risks, definitions of our risk grid 
elements, and questions. Within the questions, we asked respondents to select the most 
corresponding score for each risk. Since different respondent could have distinct preferences 
regarding the scores, we calculated the mean value for each risk to reach overall values.  
Having the overall risk scores, we could establish four risk categories [47], as depicted by 
different colors in Figure 4: low (1-5); moderate (6-11); high (12-19); extreme (20-25). For 
instance, if a risk has the time impact between two and five days, and its probability can be 
estimated by moderate, its score becomes twelve and it belongs to the high-level risks 
category.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Transportation risks in Nepal response 
Table 2 shows the transportation risks that are identified from analyzing the interviews and 
meeting minutes for the Nepal response. Geographical characteristics of Nepal, as well as 
the weather after the 2015 earthquake, provided many challenges in transportation for HOs. 
Interviewees stated that the situation after the second major earthquake became worse. 
They highlighted that raining season (monsoon) could trigger some issues that were uneasy 
to handle, like access and capacity issues. Also, they noted the mountainous location of the 
affected areas as the source of several risks that could bring many challenges to the process 
of delivering the relief items.  
Table 2. Identified transportation risks and their drivers 
Transportation risks in HSC downstream 
network 
Main driver(s) 
Delivery delays Due to inappropriate weather conditions, 
traffic density, and infrastructure 
breakdown 
 
Loss of cargo Due to accidents, landslides 
 
Insufficient capacity Due to lack of transportation availability, 
capacity, and labor 
 
Cargo decay/damage Due to inappropriate transportation 
 
Market fluctuations Due to price increase in disaster settings 
 
Unreliable information Due to infrastructure breakdown, lack of 
sources, lack of technology use 
 
Unethical behaviors Due to lack of training in the context of 
humanitarian 
 
Furthermore, we found some evidence of problems with last mile delivery. We categorized 
these incidents into the loss of cargo and the cargo damage. In the first category, our 
observations show a rise in the rate of major accidents (ground and air) due to the increase 
in the traffic density, and the low level of experience or familiarity with Nepal geographical 
context [48]. In the other category, cargo damage, we found newspaper articles regarding 
the decay of some relief items (e.g. rice) due to inappropriate transportation, like exposure 
to rain and/or high humidity. In addition to economic (HO perspective) and social 
(beneficiary perspective) impacts, incidents in these categories caused problems for HOs` 
reputation, according to our interviewees.  
Moreover, due to the increasing demand for truck transportation in the aftermath of Nepal 
earthquake, HOs faced some challenges related to transportation capacity. Our interviewees 
referred to problems (including delays and backlogs) related to transportation availability or 
capacity. We observed that some HOs spent at least one and a half day to procure 
transportation fleets for each delivery. Also, high demand for transportation resulted in 40% 
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price increase according to interviewees. However, HOs that had pre-established 
partnerships in Nepal (UMN and UNWFP) expressed fewer problems with respect to capacity 
and price change. 
We also found evidence that HOs faced information related problems such as limited access 
to reliable/up-to-date information, information systems, and technologies.  
“So, to a large extent or to some extent it is possible for anybody to get information 
about what was possible. It was...once or twice that people said, “Well this path is 
open now and that path is not open,” but to verify this [information] it’s quite 
difficult. You need to verify when you’re trying to use it. You can waste several days 
taking goods on a path that doesn’t exist [anymore]! So, I mean it’s a pretty big risk 
unless you had confidence that the source of the information was a good source. 
(23.06.2015, WVI, Kathmandu)”  
We observed that people in the field needed more training for the effective use of 
information systems and technologies in constrained contexts. We also observed a lack of 
using tracking and monitoring systems for transportation due to constrained access to 
required equipment and lack of trained drivers. 
4.2. Risks prioritization and used techniques 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of responses after assessing identified risks. As this figure 
depicts, the majority of respondents often had similar opinions regarding risk categories, 
except for “loss of cargo”. Also belonging of “cargo decay/damage” to either moderate- or 
high-level category was marginal. Figure 5 shows the divergence between final choices of 
our respondents for these two risks. We calculated the mean of responses for these two 
risks. Eventually, both “loss of cargo” and “cargo decay/damage” are categorized as 
moderate-level risks. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of responses to risk scores 
 
Figure 5. Detailed overview of responses to risk scores for loss of cargo and cargo 
decay/damage 
Table 3 shows prioritization results after calculating scores` means. Not surprisingly, all risks 
could be categorized as either moderate or high. This confirms that transportation risks 
threaten relief operations significantly. Also, having identified no risk in extreme and low 
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levels, we refer to the limitations of our field study (the number of key informants, focus on 
the distribution network, problems with scales, etc.).  
Table 3. Categorized risks 
Risk category Identified risks 
Extreme - 
High Delivery delays; insufficient capacity; market fluctuation 
Moderate Loss of cargo; cargo decay/damage; unreliable information; unethical 
behaviors 
Low - 
 
According to our interviews, we found three strategies that practitioners were using to deal 
with afore identified risks, as shown in Figure 6. As this figure shows, we could not confirm 
the use of avoiding strategy for transportation risks in Nepal. This may refer to our focus on 
interviewees with operational positions. Also, we distinguished considerable concentration 
on co-operating & transfer technique that covered four identified risks. Given categories and 
number of related risks (two moderate and two high), this shows the significance of 
cooperation in humanitarian response contexts. In the next section, we explore the role of 
LSPs accordingly. 
 
Figure 6. Identified risks management techniques and relevant risks 
4.3. Logistics service providers and transportation risks in Nepal response 
During the Nepal response, international HOs depended on the local NGO community, 
commonly referred to as implementing partners, for distribution of relief items to the 
beneficiaries. According to interviewees, NGOs with a proven track record and an extensive 
local network and knowledge were preferred as they can ensure timely and widespread 
territorial coverage in the distribution phase. The government of Nepal obliged HOs to 
identify and outsource the relief items distribution to an implementing partner. However, 
the transportation of relief items remained as a significant challenge for HOs.  
The majority of the severely affected people were difficult to reach [49]. Transporting relief 
items to these locations demanded access to different transportation modes, air/ground, 
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and reliable real-time information depending on these modes, e.g. road condition for trucks 
or weather condition for helicopters. Many participants stressed the difficulty of procuring 
and managing a fleet in the immediate response. Others stated that the management of 
heterogeneous fleets is a common challenge. Participants noted that within a few days after 
the earthquake, they found hiring a commercial carrier to manage the details of most of the 
transportation might be the simplest solution. Within this approach, HOs could take over at 
final destinations to distribute to beneficiaries. Given the above explanation, we illustrate 
the main outcomes of using LSPs in Nepal through with respect to identified risks.  
Those HOs who did not have fleets in Nepal had to either transport their fleets to the region, 
hire individual drivers with trucks, or use LSPs to take over their transportation. Transporting 
fleets to Nepal was declared “inefficient” with respect to “required fleet volume and 
variety” (WVI and IRW representatives), “local transportation opportunities” (UMN and 
Oxfam representative), and “required time for shipping” (Cordaid representative). Only 
some UN agencies, UNOCHA, UNICEF, and IFRC imported a number of light field vehicles 
from neighbor countries, like India, for transporting staff, need assessment trips, and 
medical kits delivery.  
Hiring drivers with trucks brought challenges for some HOs. According to IFRC and UNWFP 
representatives, some drivers/truck-owners refused to drive to remote areas and hence, a 
further market search was required to find new drivers or trucks. This postponed some relief 
deliveries significantly (IFRC and Canadian Red Cross representatives). Some of the 
interviewees highlighted that safety of drivers was paramount and having an accident during 
relief item transportation was a real concern. Some potential strategies for safety produce 
additional challenges. For instance, UMN representative mentioned that they were not able 
to provide the relief items to an affected area because the region was at risk of landslides. 
This participant noted that since this threat could endanger driver's life, the operation was 
postponed. The same experience happened several times to the UNWFP when transporting 
relief items to mountains with helicopters, as a few accidents were also reported [50]. 
However, those HOs who let LSPs to take over in-country transportations not only escaped 
the challenges of previous groups but also could deal with transportation risks effectively. 
Our interviewees mentioned that being mainly settled in Kathmandu helped them to have 
access to several LSPs. These LSPs were mainly active in tourist industry before the event of 
Nepal earthquake. Some HOs benefited from a number of LSPs instead of one. For instance, 
during the Nepal response different UN organizations lead distinct clusters like the UNWFP 
in the logistics cluster. Therefore, and in theory, the WFP acts as the main LSP for other UN 
organizations, like UNICEF, or even other HOs, like WVI.  
Those HOs who had signed contracts with commercial LSPs for in-country transportations 
were not influenced by fluctuations in the transportation market. Due to several reasons 
(demand increase, lack of available trucks/drivers, fuel problems, etc.), transportations 
prices raised dramatically after the earthquake. However, most of our interviewees paid 
their corresponding LSPs based on terms and conditions in their contracts. In this regard, we 
observed the importance of having ready-to-use transparent contracts.  
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Our interviews show that LSPs played a complementary role to HOs within their logistics 
capabilities. Most of the interviewees noted they are not specialized in logistics and do not 
own any kind of fleet, trucks or warehouses. Therefore, the ability of an LSP goes beyond the 
ones HOs possesses regarding logistics. Additionally, participants pointed that when LSPs 
were in charge of logistics, decision-making process became rather decentralized, providing 
a significant advantage in daily operations management in HOs. 
Another benefit of incorporating LSPs, according to interviews, was to use their knowledge 
of the region. When drivers know the area but the HO does not, there may not be enough 
information to make detailed routing plans for vehicles. Some interviewees described 
difficulties in making deliveries across rough terrains and preferred using a combination of 
small capacity all-terrain vehicles and less flexible larger trucks to adapt to damaged 
infrastructure. Another participant cited limitations in its routing because of both 
infrastructure damage and danger traveling in areas with risk of landslides. Therefore, 
interviewees explained that LSPs were able to provide them with their required fleets when 
they were needed. In addition, since LSPs maintained several connections in different 
regions (for instance with police stations), HOs benefited from these existing relationships in 
their transportation operations.  
“Our LSP have a good connection with every part of the country. In Pokhara they 
have their own office; in Chapang they have their own office; In Dhunche they have 
regular transportations … So they can call the locals and know about the road 
conditions and every other thing that we want. We can call them in advance and ask 
like road is ok or not? Sometime there are landslides in Dhunche and first we have to 
know the road conditions and other related things, so I do that before the 
departure…on the highway they also know all the police stations… we cannot work if 
we don`t have any connection. (22.06.2015, Canadian IFRC, Kathmandu)” 
Commodities in disaster relief can be many different types of goods, such as food, 
medications, or tents. Participants noted that they easily solved the problem of specific 
transportation requirements for some items with LSPs. For instance, the vehicles for 
transporting shelter items were different with the ones for specialized medicine or medical 
equipment. In addition, we found that the safety of the vehicle was included in the 
contracts, and it was based on the type of relief items being carried. In these contracts, the 
LSP had the responsibility for the safety of the cargo, such as its safety against accidents. 
The risks of accidents and unexpected events while on routes, e.g. landslides, were 
considerable in Nepal response, according to interviewees. Especially in the beginning of 
raining season, the accessibility of roads was changing constantly and unpredictably. Lack of 
technology-equipped trucks in Nepal and lack of mapping systems with updated information 
were a big challenge for transportation and required discovering the best routes by driving 
and exploring. According to interviewees, LSPs had access to several contacts in the region 
and could ask them about updated information on the roads. Therefore, they could minimize 
risks for delivery delays and accidents as far as possible.  
Table 4, summarizes key points of this section. 
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Table 4. Summary of key findings regarding the impact of LSPs on each transportation risk 
Identified risk Risk category Impact of using LSP 
Delivery delays High Improved fleet allocation, scheduling, and routing 
due to their expertise in logistics; 
Loss of cargo Moderate Improved safety and security of cargo due to 
tracking and monitoring technologies; 
Insufficient capacity High Providing access to variety of fleets and 
experienced drivers; 
Cargo decay/damage Moderate Providing appropriate cargo transportation with 
respect to the cargo and/or HOs` requirements; 
Market fluctuations High Enabling constant prices according to contract 
terms and conditions regardless of improved 
prices in the market; 
Unreliable 
information 
Moderate Enabling wide access to contacts and reliable 
sources in the region and\or country; 
Unethical behaviors Moderate Providing access to professional and trained 
human resource; 
5. Suggestions of propositions 
Although this research is of Nepal earthquake responders, our observations and findings of 
in-country transportation risks in HSC also provide general indications for other sudden 
onset natural disasters. Our rationale refers to, first, the existence of several common 
characteristics in relief operations contexts after sudden onset natural disasters. Second, our 
interviews encompassed organizations of many different sizes, capabilities, and 
infrastructures that work in various regions worldwide. And third, the context of Nepal 
entailed several challenges (aftershocks, landslides, landfalls, floods, monsoon season) for 
HOs and their supply chains. Hence, any robust solution that could deal with these 
challenges can be one of the best practices for future relief operations. In this section, we 
will discuss the implications of our findings in three propositions for the use of HOs and their 
decision makers. 
The first proposition concerns transportation risks that threaten relief operations in the 
response. Our interviews show that not all of logisticians (practitioners) were aware of and 
experienced in dealing with such risks. Although risk management and related approaches 
have been widely discussed in both commercial [11] and humanitarian literature [2], we 
observed the lack of related knowledge regarding risk management strategies in the field.  
The existence of this gap can be discussed and proved within two points. First, we combined 
several coded transcripts from various interviews to reach our list of transportation risks that 
is shown in Table 2. Most of the participants refer to the risk of delivery delay due to the 
threats to the reliability of the transportation network and did not mention the others, 
though they were highly exposed to them. However, one might expect HOs pay attention to 
all these risks because most of them are already noted in the literature under different risk 
management frameworks (for instance in [2, 4]). Second, our interviews show that 
practitioners were struggling a lot with ambiguity in the availability of vehicles, their 
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capacities and changing road conditions. They put much efforts and finance to respond to 
disruptions, as the results of those risks. For instance, we found that, except the risks of 
losing cargo and unethical behaviors of drivers, all respondents experienced delivery delays, 
lack of sufficient capacity for transportation, food-items decay, and missing reliable 
information during planning.  
We found that an excess of relief goods that have to be distributed within the constrained 
shipping capacity, bottlenecked transportation pipelines and infrastructure as well as delays 
and breakdowns in the supply delivery process, are only a few critical issues of HSCs [51-53]. 
HOs are highly threatened by delivery delays and market fluctuations in downstream. Also, 
they are exposed to moderate-level risks related to missing information, cargo decay, and 
loss of cargo. In return, HOs are cautious in planning their routes because of the physical 
safety of drivers, variations in routing and distribution times and difficulty reaching remote 
and rural beneficiaries. 
From our observations and interviews that we made in our field research, and the survey 
regarding the risks` impacts, it is concluded: 
P1. In-country transportation risks threaten the performance of response through 
moderate and high categories. 
The second proposition relates to impacts of using LSPs in HSCs. Either by reinforcing the 
response capacity [20], improving disaster preparedness skills [54], or by supporting the 
humanitarian sector with their best practices from commercial settings [55] LSPs can bring 
solutions for several challenges and issues of HOs. However, very few HOs delegate their 
logistics activities to LSPs [32]. 
Our observations and interviews revealed other benefits as well; finding qualified 
employees, managing funds, deploying assets, and locating facilities in disaster settings. Our 
findings support similar research studies in the literature: learning opportunities for 
humanitarian and commercial sides [33], improvement of the efficiency and capabilities of 
humanitarian logistics [5, 30], and enhancement of coordination and decision-making in 
HSCs [24]. Although some of these benefits can be reached by hiring local commercial 
drivers, however, the concept of LSPs are much broader.  
Beside the above positive impacts, in the few experiences of participants, they pointed to 
the positive influence of using LSPs in the scope of risk management. This became more 
apparent when our participants categorized in-country transportation risks as moderate- 
and high-level risks. Given the possible disruptions as a result of such risks, HOs either 
transferred them to LSPs or reduced their probability by improving HSC flexibility with the 
use of LSPs. Our analyses show that by using LSPs, transportation risks can be transferred or 
reduced effectively. 
In this regard, LSPs improved HOs access to a wider logistics capacity, the variety of fleets, 
the up-to-date tracking technology, and enhanced cargo safety (due to better 
transportation). They changed the often centralized operational decision-making in the field 
[56] to a rather decentralized one providing more flexibility in the daily management of 
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relief distribution. Furthermore, LSPs are more familiar with the affected area from several 
perspectives. Exploring the tradeoffs of different routing behaviors helped HOs to improve 
delivery quantity while maintaining a high level of safety. In addition, since natural disasters 
are also information disasters [57], LSPs access to extensive network brought reliable 
information to HO. Although we observed the lack of technology-equipped fleets, we found 
that LSPs used their knowledge about environment effectively and also shared them with 
each other. Moreover, due to the familiarity of local LSPs with geographical characteristics of 
Nepal, their partner HOs experienced fewer disruptions due to accidents and inappropriate 
cargo transportation. 
With respect to our risk assessments results and the analysis of risks management strategies, 
we suggest that: 
P2. Using LSPs is an effective approach for HOs to transfer and to reduce some high- 
and moderate- level in-country transportation risks.  
The third proposition reflects our findings regarding the whole performance of HSC. in 
addition to afore advantages that HOs achieved regarding managing in-country risks, our 
interviewees admitted that LSPs helped them to “bypass some challenges with local 
government policies, like customs control”. Moreover, our analyses confirm that using local 
LSPs not only helped local communities (e.g. supported local economy) to become more 
resilient [32, 58], it improved the relief operations in terms of the coverage, delivery time, 
and operations costs [37].  
Our analyses also show that HOs often kept a minimum level of coverage (80-85% of 
estimated households) in their relief distributions during Nepal response. However, their 
main concern was to maintain optimized performance regarding responsiveness and 
efficiency. In this regard, we observed that those HOs who used LSPs showed better 
performance in these criteria. We confirmed this observation by first, assessing possible 
impacts that in-country transportation risks could have on effectiveness, efficiency, and 
responsiveness. Second, we showed how HOs managed those risks by using LSPs.  
Indeed, using the capacities and capabilities of LSPs bring two main advantages to HOs. First, 
HOs will have the opportunity to transfer some operational risks to LSPs because they have 
more experience and expertise in managing logistics. LSPs assisted HOs to reach more 
beneficiaries (coverage), to decrease delivery time and delays (response time), and to drop 
the chance of being affected by price change in transportation market (costs). Second, LSPs 
improved HSC flexibility with providing more reliable and updated information, enhanced 
decision-making, better tracking and monitoring, and access to a variety of fleets. Therefore, 
LSPs play a significant role in improving the HSC performance. 
P3. Using LSPs implies performance improvement of HSC in response with respect to 
flexibility, efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness. 
Considering above three research propositions, we highlight our contribution within two 
points. First, we empirically confirmed positive impacts of using LSPs, as “tools” [24] for 
managing in-country transportation risks. Second, given previously studied roles for LSPs in 
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HSCs (members, tools, actors) [24], our research shows that LSPs can also be “contributors” 
to performance improvements. This role shows the positive influence of LSPs on HSC 
performance which helps to justify the cost of their services.  
5.1. Implications for Theory 
We shed light on the significance of using LSPs for in-country transportation in humanitarian 
response. Having studied the role of LSPs in managing transportation risks within a real case, 
we empirically confirmed their role as “tool” in HSC. We think moderate- and high-level 
transportation risks can be reduced by or transferred to LSPs due to their expertise in 
logistics, experience in shipping, and access to technology with a reasonable cost. 
Our study also shows another role for LSPs in HSC; “contributors”. According to Bealt, 
Fernández Barrera and Mansouri [32], LSPs are considered less appropriate for response 
rather than preparedness. While the criteria for appropriateness are not clearly discussed in 
the afore paper, our empirical study shows that LSPs play a significant role in improving the 
HSC performance in response. Our criteria include flexibility, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
responsiveness. Using LSPs not only results in improvements in HSC flexibility with respect to 
much broader logistics expertise and better access to information, but also enhances relief 
coverage, costs, and delivery time. 
Our research has other implications for theory as well. First, while our findings support the 
positive impacts of LSPs on HSC performance, research toward what criteria must be 
considered for selecting and cooperating with LSPs in humanitarian contexts is missing. 
Practitioners also require some practical key performance indicators in order to be able to 
evaluate such cooperation before starting the next mission. Second, with respect to 
transportation risks that threaten disaster relief operations, humanitarian context needs 
more empirical research in both upstream and downstream part. In downstream, the scope 
of our research, since we could not find any risk in low- or extreme-level, we think this shows 
that our scale needs more verification.  
5.2. Implications for Practice 
As the main implication for practice, our research suggests a systematic use of LSPs in 
disaster relief operations. However, before commencing such cooperation (in terms of 
partnerships or other concepts) some challenges have to be considered: differences in 
mandates and/or goals, differences in working rhythms, culture, and individual perspective 
[30], limited resources for developing partnerships [59] , field problems for commercial 
partners [60], different perspectives of affected communities, and lack of key performance 
indicators for LSPs in humanitarian contexts. 
Accordingly, the inclusion of commercial LSPs in cluster systems may bring some 
coordination challenges as well. Our field research shows the effective role of UNWFP as the 
main humanitarian LSP in the logistics cluster during Nepal response. It improved the 
coordination and the flow of relief distribution efforts through the cluster system [58]. 
However, since commercial LSPs do not have to follow the humanitarian principles, 
practitioners needed other mechanisms to ensure that they are adhered to. As a solution, 
we observed that the role of commercial LSPs in Nepal response was mainly limited to the 
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first category (very few in the second category); asset-owning logistics companies that 
perform physical logistics tasks.  
Furthermore, our research suggests improving the HSC flexibility to reduce being disrupted 
by risks. In this regard, different supply chain strategies can be adapted to improve flexibility. 
While one approach toward this improvement can be the systematic use of LSPs, other 
approaches also need consideration; as Baharmand, Comes and Lauras [17] suggest 
incorporating decision support systems (DSS) and information and communication 
technology (ICT). The former can assist the critical decision-making in chaotic and complex 
environments, like the aftermath of disasters, regarding optimum use of capacities [15]. The 
latter provides several opportunities for tracking and monitoring systems that can avoid risks 
regarding cargo delays, losses, and damages [15]. 
6. Conclusions 
Despite positive impacts of using logistics service providers (LSPs) in commercial supply 
chains, LSPs` role in humanitarian contexts is still marginal [6]. In this regard, recent surveys 
reveal the lack of field grounded research regarding the outcomes of using LSPs in 
humanitarian supply chains (HSCs) [24, 37, 61]. Our empirical research aims to address this 
gap and studies the role of LSPs in managing in-country transportation risks in disaster relief 
operations.  
Having conducted a field research after the 2015 Nepal earthquake, we found seven 
transportations risks during Nepal response. They are delivery delays; insufficient capacity; 
market fluctuation; loss of cargo; cargo decay/damage; unreliable information; and unethical 
behaviors. We then categorized these risks by developing a risks assessment grid in close 
collaboration with practitioners. Our results show that delivery delays, insufficient capacity, 
and market fluctuation were high risks in Nepal response while the others belonged to 
moderate risks. Further analysis of our qualitative data shows that Nepal responders mainly 
used reducing and transferring techniques for dealing with identified risks. In this regard, we 
could study the role of LSPs in each technique according to our Nepal field research. 
According to our interviewees and the experiences that they shared with us, we found that 
using LSPs implies several improvements in HSCs. As as result, LSPs can be “contributors” to 
performance improvements as well as “member”, “tools”, and “actors” in HSCs. Our findings 
highlighted the role of LSPs in providing a wide range of transportation means, especially 
trucks for Nepal case. Also, they played a complementary role to HOs within their expertise 
and experiences with logistics, specifically for transportation. Furthermore, LSPs` wide 
access to contacts among authorities could provide updated and reliable information for 
HOs. Involving LSPs for operational decisions, enhanced scheduling, decreased delivery 
delays, and fosters HSC responsiveness. Moreover, LSPs could offer experienced drivers that 
decreased the risks of road accidents, cargo damage, and unethical behaviors. In return, 
using LSPs helped the local economy since the tourism business, one of the main sources of 
outcome for locals, was severely disrupted after the Nepal earthquake.  
Our research indicates implications for both theory and practice. In the former, we highlight 
two dimensions: criteria for selecting LSPs and key performance indicators for evaluating 
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them; and lack of empirical research regarding risk management in HSCs. In the latter, while 
our research suggests a systematic use of LSPs in disaster relief operations, we also highlight 
other supply chain capabilities that can help humanitarians to avoid risks in disaster 
contexts, such as flexibility.  
Our research is limited from various aspects. First, our list of in-country transportation risks 
is not exhaustive in the context of humanitarian response to a natural sudden onset disaster 
and more research is required to study risks in similar contexts. Second, transportation risks 
may be studied in other contexts as well, like in conflicts that are far more complicated than 
natural disasters. Third, lack of finding low- and extreme-level risks in this research indicates 
that our scales for risks assessment require further verification. Fourth, managing 
transportation risks in humanitarian contexts should not be limited to using LSPs and future 
study can study other solutions as well given that all HOs are not able to use LSPs. Fifth, our 
research shed limited light on the improvements that can be achieved though enhancing 
HSC flexibility and hence, this requires further investigation. Sixth, transportation risks cover 
only one category of risks that threaten HOs in humanitarian response and studying other 
risks in this context helps to better plan and implement in risk management strategies.  
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Appendix – Semi-structure interview protocol for Nepal field 
research 
Interview Introduction  
Introduce the research team and briefly outline the research mission’s background, 
rationale, objectives and intended deliverables: We want to study the challenges in disaster 
response from different perspectives; logistics, information management, and coordination. 
Go through the main elements of the interview (only logistics perspective). 
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▲ To be addressed when there is little time 
▼ Address if time is available 
Part 1: Information about the interviewee 
 ▲ Role (in the response to the earthquake) 
 ▲ Responsibility, task/job description, rotation  
 ▲ Experience, training, background and daily job 
 Part 2 Information about the organization 
 ▲ Objective, mandate  
 ▲ Type and size of organization, size of operation, duration 
 ▼ Network: formal and informal links to other organizations (local community 
groups,  
     diaspora, other (I)NGOs, government bodies (regional, national, international)  
 ▼ Relief team composition in Nepal 
Part 3: Logistics processes and flows 
 ▲ How is the structure of your supply chain (describe)? What logistics sources do 
you have? 
 ▲ What is the state of logistics (transport capacity, hubs and warehouses, 
distribution centers)? 
 ▲ What risks do threaten your logistics? How do you deal with them?  
 ▲ What is the flow cartography? Where are the bottlenecks? 
 ▼ How do you usually deploy your required logistics (place or transportation)?  
 ▼ What characteristics do you usually consider when you are deploying them? 
Part 4: Accessibility and priority 
 ▲ Who decides where to go and what to deliver? 
 ▲ How your targeted affected populations are reached?  
 ▲ How do priority items are procured, and then delivered (how can these be 
improved)? 
 ▲ What, if anything, limits access to the affected populations?  
 ▼ How do you access very remote areas (How do you deal with constraints)? 
 ▼ In your point of view, which areas are the most critical and what are the priority 
sectors (health, food, shelter, etc.)? How does this assessment affect your 
operations? 
Part 5: Information and coordination 
 ▲ What information is available for making decisions and what is missing (what do 
you know and what do you need to know)?  
 ▲ What is the source of information and how accurate do you assess the available 
information (1 to 5)? 
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 ▲ How do you verify information?  
 ▲ What risks do threaten your information access? How do you deal with them? 
 ▼ How is information shared? What products were useful / what problems were less 
useful? 
 ▼ What type of ICT systems and products do you use in your organization? 
 ▼ What gaps do you see in the information? 
Part 6: Best practices 
 ▲ How do you compare this disaster response with other deployments? 
 ▲ What are the main differences or challenges posed in this specific disaster 
response?  
 ▼ What did work specifically very well in Nepal deployment? 
Interview round up 
Explain that the combined insights and recommendations from the research mission will be 
shared with the respondent in the form of a short paper. Ask if the respondent can 
recommend other contacts relevant to the research project. Ask if it’s okay to get back to 
the respondent in the near future with additional questions (if required). 
